During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Polish Development Fund (PFR) played a key role in stabilizing the Polish economy by providing financial subsidies to entrepreneurs under the so-called Financial Shields. These programs, designed to support companies affected by lockdowns, were among the largest aid initiatives in Polish history.
However, with the end of the support period, cases of subsidy repayment demands have emerged, often based on suspected abuses, with the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA) playing a significant role. This article examines the CBA's role in PFR debt collection processes, with particular emphasis on the mechanisms of COVID-19 subsidies, the legal basis for repayment demands, and the practical and legal challenges associated with this process.
The Polish Development Fund (PFR) launched Financial Shields 1.0 and 2.0, which aimed to support entrepreneurs in maintaining financial liquidity during the pandemic. These subsidies, financed from public funds, were granted based on program regulations, which specified eligibility criteria such as a decrease in economic turnover, the number of employees, and the absence of tax and social security arrears. The principles for granting subsidies were based on specific provisions, including regulations issued pursuant to the Act of 2 March 2020 on specific solutions related to the prevention, counteraction, and combating of COVID-19 (Journal of Laws 2020, item 374).
The subsidies were non-repayable, provided certain conditions were met, such as maintaining business activity or employment levels for a specified period. In the event of a breach of these conditions, the Polish Development Fund could demand repayment of the subsidy in whole or in part, opening the way to debt collection proceedings.
The Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA) also played a significant role in shaping disbursement procedures and beneficiary verification – in line with the legislature's intention – whose statutory responsibilities include, among other things, counteracting corruption and protecting the state's economic interests. This approach was also reflected in the context of the Financial Shields – where the CBA's actions were intended to encompass both prevention and response to identified irregularities. As part of the so-called "anticorruption shield," the CBA identifies companies that allegedly pose a risk of corruption, economic crimes, or money laundering. The problem, however, remains that these recommendations are vague and often unsupported by concrete evidence. From the perspective of businesses, this approach may raise serious doubts about its legality, yet the Fund appears to unthinkingly rely on these assessments, shifting the burden of proof to businesses, which is contrary to the principles of civil procedure.
Businesses often learn of negative recommendations only after receiving a lawsuit, preventing them from taking remedial action sooner. Furthermore, the lack of transparency on the part of the CBA and the Polish Development Fund means that companies have no opportunity to respond to the allegations, which violates their rights of defense. In practice, this creates a narrative in which the CBA's involvement itself suggests a crime, despite the lack of concrete evidence, while businesses themselves receive only a statement of the increased risk of irregularities. This situation casts businesses in an unfavorable light, especially in the eyes of courts, which may issue payment orders based on scant information. It then becomes necessary to file an appropriate objection, only to subsequently demonstrate to the court that the lawsuit is unfounded.
The scale of the problem related to subsidy repayment requests prompted the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) to initiate an audit of the activities of the Polish Development Fund (PFR) and the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA). This audit, initiated in response to complaints from businesses and appeals from organizations such as the Entrepreneurship Council, aims to assess whether the PFR's actions were legal and whether the CBA's recommendations were justified. The audit's findings may shed new light on the issue and potentially lead to a change in the PFR's approach to beneficiary verification. In the long term, reforms are necessary to ensure greater transparency in verification processes and the protection of entrepreneurs' rights. It is crucial to establish clear rules for post-termination audits of subsidy agreements and ensure that CBA recommendations are supported by concrete evidence and subject to judicial review. Without these changes, entrepreneurs' trust in public institutions could be seriously undermined.
For many companies, demands for subsidy repayment pose not only a financial burden but also significant stress and uncertainty. Significantly, courts in some cases issue rulings in favor of businesses, citing the lack of sufficient evidence from the Polish Development Fund (PFR) and the illegality of the "additional inspections." Determining whether the PFR acted within its authority and whether its demands are based on the subsidy agreements is crucial to any resolution – and the support of a professional attorney can be extremely helpful in this regard.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
The law is current as of July 16, 2025.
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